I believe-that none of the conventionally accepted limits between the so-called human being and the so-called animal one, none of the oppositions, none of the supposedly linear and indivisible boundaries-resist a rational deconstruction… (Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason).
Hugin to recognize the difference between knowing where the cheese was hidden and knowing how to deceive Munin. How could Hugin decipher the intentions of Munin to eat the cheese? In a similar experiment, the ravens observed Thomas Bugnyar and his colleague Bernd Heinrich gaze at a spot on the other side of a barrier. In this case, all the ravens hopped off their perches to observe the curious gaze of the scientists.
2 This experiment begs the question concerning how the ravens could be aware that the scientists were perceiving something that they could not. How are scientists and philosophers to characterize this capacity for both curiosity and deception if not by recourse to cognition? I think we have to begin by investigating whether or not there is a sufficient condition which entails true cognition. The Oxford researcher, Marion Stamp
Dawkins, argues that true cognition happens when an animal solves a problem under novel conditions. The problem-solving capacity of ravens when confronted with both unique situations might lead us to believe that the true cognition we sometimes attribute exclusively to humans seems to extend far beyond our species. A host of other previous experiments have proven how mammals, including chimpanzees, elephants, dolphins, and dogs also share attributes of true cognition. 3 From a precursory glance at the following experiments, we are left with a perplexing question concerning the degree of analogical difference between human and animal cognition.
To analogically attribute these same cognitive capacities to animals requires that we consider our own species as existing within a biological continuum with such animals. This position challenges us to rethink our ethical relation to nonhuman animals and ultimately leads us to investigate the nature of the animality which conditions and informs our rationality.
Unfortunately, the history of philosophy has taught us to think otherwise.
In both the analytic and continental traditions of philosophy, there remains a common tendency unquestionably to affirm the sharp division between nonhuman animals and human PhaenEx beings on the basis of language. The claim shared by both traditions is that there can be neither thoughts nor thinking without language. The dependence of language on thinking appears to be self-evident. How can we distinguish speaking from expressing thoughts? In his essay, "Thought and Talk," Donald Davidson argues that thinking constituted by a complex pattern of background beliefs depends upon speech. 4 Moreover, the attribution of beliefs is inseparable from the capacity to interpret speech. I can determine what another speaker has chosen and interpret the purposes of their intentions only if I have the capacity to assign a relevant set of beliefs to that speaker. In other words, I have to be a member of that speech community with a capacity to attribute beliefs in order to interpret speech: "The dog, we say, knows that his master is home. But does it know that Mr. Smith (who is his master), or that the president of the bank (who is that same master), is home? We have no real idea how to settle, or make sense of, these questions" (Davidson 163) . It is impossible to have sufficient grounds for ascribing beliefs to nonhuman animals who lack the capacity of uttering sentences. Davidson poses the question of whether or not a nonhuman animal can have any grounds whatsoever for ascribing beliefs, yet ultimately concedes that they cannot since someone can only have a belief if he or she understands the possibility of being mistaken by conceptually grasping the difference between true and false beliefs. Nonhuman animals do not have the capacity to distinguish between true and false beliefs and therefore cannot be mistaken.
II. Heidegger's Problem
The twentieth century continental philosopher, Martin Heidegger, utilizes the same modus operandi to justify the absence of language in nonhuman animals. Since nonhuman animals lack Davidson's cognitive capacity of belief ascription, they lack conceptual understanding, i.e., the capacity to apprehend their environment as an environment. Heidegger's 1929 -1930 provides an elaborate justification for such a conclusion by relying upon a set of ontological categories to distinguish animals from human beings. The human being is "world-forming"
(weltbildend), the stone is altogether "without world" (weltlos), and the animal is "poor-inworld" (weltarm). 5 Heidegger expresses the poverty of the animal by explaining how the animal is essentially captive to its environment. Animals behave (sich benehmen) by responding to certain instinctual drives of flight and pursuit which allow them to move within their environment. However, they can never come to comprehend or understand their environment as an environment. Animals are limited by their capacity to perceive and therefore lack the conceptual capacity to comprehend what they encounter as having any objective existence. For example, the lizard lying on a rock may have some awareness of the rock, but not as a rock. The bee which is guided in its flight by light is not aware of the light that impinges on it as light (Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts 198) . This capacity for things to present themselves in such a way that they become manifest as having objective existence in each particular case distinguishes the human being from the animal. The capacity of the human being to attend to the objective existence of things is a necessary condition for the formation of a world. Animals captive to their environment and absorbed in the totality of instinctive drives are therefore "poor- to a decisively Greek understanding of conceptuality (ırismÒw) by asserting that the human being with the capacity for conceptuality provides meaning to the world through discourse or language (lÒgw): "A ırismÒw is a lÒgw, a specific being in the world, which meets with the present world in its proper character of being-present (Da-character), it addresses it in its proper being" (Grundbegriffe 40). While Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology privileges the role of lÒgw as the equiprimordial condition of being-in-the-world, he neglects to consider sufficiently the relation of lÒgw to animality, i.e., how our comportment to the world through lÒgw is informed by our bodily comportment to the world as animals. Aristotle's own admission that the human being is a rational animal (z«n lÒgn ¶xn) acknowledges the embodied nature of lÒgw. The development of this capacity ultimately depends upon the capacities we share with members of other non-human animal species. Contrary to Heidegger's claim that Aristotle's philosophy privileges the role of lÒgw as the distinctive essence of the human being, it also may be argued that no philosopher has more extensively considered the aporetic nature of lÒgw in both human beings and animals. For Aristotle, lÒgw is oriented by our capacity as animals to perceive the world. While prevalent within the human being as the capacity of thinking and speech, lÒgw displays a certain heterogeneity in its relation to the other capacities of the soul. Aristotle's treatises devoted to animality both curiously assume the hegemony of lÒgw and equivocally call it into question. If we are to take seriously Heidegger's debt to Aristotle, we might begin by retrieving his interpretation of lÒgw and its relation to these other capacities of life.
In his unpublished 1922 Aristotle Introduction, Heidegger investigates how being as a principle (érxAE) and cause ( ‡tin) of life becomes articulated through lÒgw. Heidegger affirms the plurivocity of the word "life" being literally said in many ways (pllx«w lgÒmnn) as a fundamental phenomenon throughout the history of Greek-Christian interpretation. Life is to be understood as a middle-voiced phenomenon and therefore as a kind of movement or caring (curare), a "being-out-towards" (Aussein auf etwas) the world. 6 The movement of caring is defined by the dealings (Umgang) which life has with its world as it is anticipated, oriented towards, and interpreted in its meaningfulness (Bedeutsamkeit).
7 LÒgw is what originates this meaningfulness as a primordial directedness towards and absorption in the world. While lÒgw possesses the capacity to distance itself from the world through theoretical reflection, it also produces an inclination towards falling into the world (Verfallensgeneigtheit)
as its essential tendency (Hang) and innermost fate (Verhängnis).
8 LÒgw exhibits the tendency of falling towards the world and thereby being absorbed in the world because the world is tempting for life. If we are to disclose the meaning of lÒgw and its relevance for the superficial demarcation between the human being and the animal, we must first understand how lÒgw arises out of this movement in a world. 9 Aristotle first introduces this movement of the lÒgw in the Physics from which both his ontology and logic develop: "The central phenomenon, whose PhaenEx explication is the theme of the Physics, becomes the being in the How of its being-moved (Bewegtseins)" (PIA 26). Heidegger discloses the principles grounding the phenomenon of being as being-moved by examining the way in which the object has initially been given (kinÊmnn [what is moving]) and how it comes to be viewed: "The above research is characterized as érxAE research…on the basis of which the kinÊmnn comes to be seen" (PIA 43). ArxAE -research is primarily critical by interrogating those principles that ground phenomena and are thus included in any pre-given interpretation. 10 Aristotle's Physics functions as the first critical mode of access to the prior interpretations of the phenomena of nature (fÊsiw) and being (Ès¤) by introducing a new interpretation that is by definition (ÙrismÒw) consonant with being-moved. Aristotle counters the static Eleatic conception of being with the determination of being as a phenomenon of movement (kinÊmnn) and therefore as something which is capable of being-claimed and discussed (lgÒmnn). LÒgw becomes the decisive component for investigating all the subsequent problems in the Physics: "What has been taken up as a theme of research, i.e., the kinÊmnn…one that is addressed and discussed…are mtã lÒg" (PIA 45). This claiming of entities by lÒgw discloses their meaningfulness. Heidegger traces the advent of this meaningfulness or being beginning with its primordial meaning as literally a having or possession (Ès¤) that is available for use by being-produced. In production, the possession or having ( ¶xin) of being comes into appearance (Anwesen). The starting point for an exposition of lÒgw is a phenomenological interpretation of movement (k¤nsiw) which attempts to understand how the problem of being arises in relation to those objects which are produced and used in the world:
The object field which provides the primordial sense of Being is the object field of those objects which are produced and used in dealings…That which is finished in the movement of the dealings of production (p¤siw), that which has arrived at its Beingpresent-at-hand (Vorhandensein), available for use-tendency, is that which is. (PIA 26)
Being-produced (p¤siw) is the being-available of that which can be grasped as an appearance (‰dw) and thus claimed and discussed (l°gin). The ontological structures which determine the course of human life are conditioned by the relation between the objects of the dealings and the ways of claiming and discussing which belong to these dealings.
While the world comes to be disclosed by encountering the entities in these dealings as beings by always speaking about them as this or that (l°gin ti ktã tinw), one first encounters these entities by being-moved and being affected (pãsxin ti) by them. The primordiality of sense perception ( ‡sysiw) discloses entities as necessarily true by virtue of how they appear to us. Since sense perception is an originary openness which binds both humans and animals together in their finite receptivity to the world, one must begin to understand this capacity of being-moved and being-affected as grounding the possibility of world disclosure. If the phenomenon of k¤nsiw as the very being of the living is an incomplete movement ( §n°rgi étlØw), then the possibility of being-affected only arises from this essentially incomplete openness as the most fundamental indication of finitude. Here one would also have to include the phenomenon of lÒgw as harboring within itself this primordial pãyw of affectivity. While lÒgw is distinguished from sense perception by speaking about those entities that appear and thereby risking the possibility of falsity, lÒgw shares a kinship with sense perception in this ability to take up the object before distinguishing it as something (sÊnysiw) by explicitly asserting (épÒfnsiw) how it appears: PhaenEx What it says is said on the basis of this object and is drawn from (épÒ) it. Accordingly, épÒf¤nsyi (asserting) is to be understood as letting the object 'appear' for itself (middle voice) from out of itself and as it is in itself. (PIA 32) This possibility for lÒgw is literally its way of disclosing entities as beings. Heidegger investigates Aristotle's definition of lÒgw as this finite limit which orients the human being by choosing between the possibilities of assertion and non-assertion, thereby distinguishing that which is said from that which remains unsaid. Every saying or asserting is a bringing together or inclusion (sÊnysiw) and a taking apart or exclusion (di¤rsiw). The bringing together or included possibility that an object is white is always posited together with the excluded possibility that the object is not white. 11 Throughout De Anima, Aristotle even describes how sense perception possesses its own unique mode of lÒgw:
Similarly, a sense ( ‡sysiw) too is affected (pãsxi) by a thing which has color or flavor or sound, not insofar as that thing is signified by its name, but insofar as it is suchand-such (i.e. colored or flavored or sounding) and according to the corresponding formula (éll √ tind¤, k‹ ktå tÚn lÒgn). (De Anima 2.12.424a23-25)
Heidegger privileges lÒgw as the distinctive essence of Dasein, yet does not sufficiently investigate how lÒgw is ultimately always already conditioned and informed by sense perception. If lÒgw depends upon this capacity to take things up and discriminate between them in and through the same modality of sense perception we share with members of other animal species, we must begin to reconfigure our understanding of the primacy of lÒgw as exclusive to the human domain.
12 Perhaps lÒgw is no longer the distinguishing hegemonic attribute of the human species but a capacity shared with other animals for the sake of living well. In the final paragraph of De Anima, Aristotle even alludes to the capacities of sense perception as necessary for living a happy life: "An animal possesses the senses (tåw d êllw fisyAEsiw ¶xi tÚ z"n)…not for the sake of existing but for the sake of living well (È tË ‰ni ßnk éllå tË Ô)" (De Anima 3.13.435b20-21).
For Aristotle, human existence both includes and excludes animal life. Human existence is separated and opposed to animal life with lÒgw while always already maintaining a relation to animal life with sense perception. 13 With the capacities of sense perception and lÒgw, living beings are thrown into the world as the embodiment of their finitude and thereby open to the movement of unconcealment (élAEyi). 14 How are we to determine that the animal is "poor-inworld" if the animal does indeed possess something akin to lÒgw? Are the capacities of lÒgw within the human and the animal too distinct to be considered in their unity? It is not insignificant that throughout De Anima, Aristotle continuously returns to probe this enigmatic relation between lÒgw and sense perception which supposedly demarcates human existence from animal life: "…the sensitive part (tÚ fisytikÒn), which one could not easily place either as irrational or as having reason…(¯ Ît …w êlgn Ît …w lÒgn ¶xn y¤ ên tiw rd¤w)" (De Anima 2.13.432a30f).
15
Perhaps the greatest perplexity in the traditional hierarchy of the soul arises when
Heidegger considers the relation between lÒgw and the highest human capacity of cognition, the intellect (nËw). Aristotle claims that the activity of thinking (nÒsiw) as the immediacy of perceiving and having-perceived best expresses the idea of pure movement or being-moved. The human being that has as its end (t°lw) this pure beholding (yr›n) approximates this condition. 16 For Aristotle, the intellect fulfills its explicit function only within this rarified domain of yr›n and therefore cannot be submitted to the theoretical and practical distinction PhaenEx introduced with the addition of lÒgw. However, Heidegger's own allegiance to this distinction too hastily privileges how the theoretical function of the intellect comes to be critically disclosed through l°gin, which makes the entity known in the enactment of sÊnysiw and di¤rsiw so that the intellect comes to be understood as a discursive mode of thinking (di-n›syi). While entities are discursively encountered by being claimed through the articulation of l°gin, the intellect as presented by Aristotle is ideally to remain unarticulated and without discourse (êlÒgn) as a pure perceiving which produces illumination for the mode of theoretical contemplation (sf¤) and orients decision for the mode of practical deliberation (frÒnsiw).
The intellect operates analogously with the immediacy of sense perception insofar as it brings to entities their direct givenness as they are disclosed. The look or appearance of entities (‰dw) is produced by the intellect which orients lÒgw-to claim the entity as a being. The intellect is what grasps the first principles or universals that illuminate being. The receptive openness of sense perception and the intellect to encounter and discover entities as beings seems to fulfill a homogeneous function within the soul which only complicates their alleged separation. Both also disclose a certain heterogeneity in their aporetic relation to the other capacities. The intellect shares with sense perception a pure and simple perceiving, yet this immediacy retained throughout Aristotle's exposition is called into question by Heidegger once he begins to consider how the intellect interacts with lÒgw. If the pure intellect also possesses a discursive capacity to interact with the lÒgw, how does it still retain its non-discursive immediacy to grasp these first principles as its distinguishing attribute? If the boundaries separating the intellect from lÒgw cannot be sufficiently demarcated, then ultimately the boundary separating animal life from human existence becomes an even more perplexing question.
This ambiguity is particularly telling when we examine how the intellect is involved in deliberation for the sake of a decision. Aristotle describes this practical deliberation as foresight (frÒnsiw), which curiously applies to both humans and animals: "It is in view of this that people say that some beasts too are prudent, namely those which appear to have the power of foresight (dÊnmin prntikAEn) with regard to their own way of life" (Nicomachean Ethics 6.7.1141a27-29). Foresight is characterized by an intentional structure of knowing one's way around in the world in order to distinguish between competing alternatives, and thus is always the world in contemplation as the most proper mode of being fully present. 17 Aristotle's conception of this authentic Existenz essentially removes and effectively isolates the movement of lÒgw from its own essential thrownness of being-alongside and fallen into the world.
III. Reviving Fundamental Ontology
Heidegger's projected conclusion to his never-published treatise on Aristotle aimed to retrieve another beginning of lÒgw in its being-alongside and being-affected by the world by Aristotle says, ≤ cxØ tå ˆnt p≈w §stin. "The soul of the human being, is in a certain way, entities." The soul which makes up the being of the human being has aesthesis and noesis among its ways of being, and in these it discovers all entities, both in the fact that they are, and in their Being as they are-that is, always in their Being. (Sein und Zeit 14)
Throughout the existential analytic of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger thoroughly conceals the fateful link between the zoological residue of sense-perception and the distinctive ontological role of the intellect by neglecting to consider the capacity of sense perception to discover and distinguish between entities by the primordial disclosedness of how we find ourselves (Be-findlichkeit) attuned to the world through the opacity of our moods (Stimmungen). The valorization of the intellect to disclose the existence of these entities as they are encountered in everyday dealings effectively prioritizes Dasein over all other living beings worthy of ontological clarification. This unbridgeable separation between fundamental ontology and zoology betrays an anxiety which haunts the history of metaphysics and his own thought. 21 The capacity of the animal to possess lÒgw raises a series of ontological questions regarding the boundary between the human and the animal which deserve a more sufficient investigation. 22 What are the consequences for retrieving the project of the fundamental ontology according to this reinterpretation of lÒgw as a mode of living movement? Moreover, how does our reconception of lÒgw impact our understanding of Aristotle's own ontology? Perhaps this retrieval of lÒgw in its heterogeneity might encourage further research into the enigma of the living and promote a revival of zoontology as the ground of Heidegger's thinking. 8 Heidegger claims that ruinance characterized by fallenness is a basic character of caring which is otherwise determined by the facticity of being-thrown into a world. Thrownness is Dasein's alreadiness (Gewesenheit) which temporally corresponds to the fallenness of presenting (Gegenwart) and the pursuit or future becoming (Zukunft) of alreadiness (Gewesenheit), see especially the second division of Sein und Zeit: "But taking over thrownness signifies being Dasein authentically as it already was. Taking over thrownness, however is possible in such a way that the futural Dasein can be its ownmost 'as-it-already-was'-that is to say, its 'been' [sein "Gewesen"]" (326). 9 Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.4.1030a9-10, 322-323: To state or assert something is nothing other than stating its definition (ÙrismÒw) or the essence (t‹ ∑ ‹ni) of a thing in which a thing is said to be by virtue of itself (ky ÍtÒ). Thus, there is an essence (t‹ ∑ ‹ni) only of those things whose formula (lÒgw) is a definition (ÙrismÒw)." 10 Aristotle's Physics A approaches the problem of the first principles (érx¤) of movement (k¤nsiw) with an explication of st°rsiw (chapter 7) while Physics B treats the facticity of natural beings (fÊsi ˆnt) (chapters 4-6). Physics G provides a thematic analysis of k¤nsiw explaining its primordial structures, namely dÊnmiw (potentiality), i.e., the in each case particular availability of…; §n°rgi (actuality), i.e., the putting to work of this availability; and §ntl°xi (the fulfillment in which something has reached its end); ie. the maintaining (in true safekeeping) of this availability that has been put to work.
11 Thomas Sheehan examines the contribution of Heidegger's analysis of sÊnysiw and di¤rsiw to the movement of Dasein: "In the oral version of the course, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (February 27 1930) Heidegger said that diairesis seen as human transcendence, 'pulls us asunder as it were, and grants us a stretching ahead, takes us away into the possible…' But at the same time the human being returns from that transcendence to entities so as to know them in terms of possibility, i.e., 'so as to allow the possible -as what empowers the actual -to speak back to the actual in a binding way'…binding or bonding it: synthesis" (80).
as fact: that indeed the animal is fisytikÒn, kritikÒn --in the manner of bringing out. And just as little as we are allowed to shove aside the developed meaning of lÒgw in the sense of conversance. For the matter surely demands that we do not deny lÒgw to the animal as it now stands --or else leave the question open. And this is just the position that Aristotle takes unambiguously at De an. G 9, 432a30f.: tÚ fisytikÒn, ¯ Ît …w êlgn Ît …w lÒgn ¶xn y¤ ên tiw rd¤w. "No one may easily settle with regard to the ability to perceive, whether this is a capability without conversance or a conversant capability." This caution with regard to deciding and questioning must even today remain for us exemplary, irrespective of the further question of where the essential boundary runs between animal and human" (Heidegger, Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta, (1) (2) (3) .
